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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
With the written consent of the Petitioner and the
Respondent filed with the Clerk of the Court, Amici respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
CHILD USA is the leading national non-profit
think tank working to end child abuse and neglect in
the United States. CHILD USA engages in high-level
legal, social science, and medical research and analysis
to derive the best public policies to end child abuse and
neglect. Distinct from an organization engaged in the
direct delivery of services, CHILD USA develops evidence-based solutions and information needed by policymakers, youth-serving organizations, courts, media,
and the public to increase child protection and the common good. CHILD USA works to protect children from
abuse in various contexts including its national child
sex abuse statute of limitations reform initiative.
CHILD USA’s interests in this case are directly correlated with its mission to increase public safety and
eliminate barriers to justice for child sex abuse victims
who have been harmed by individuals and institutions.

1

Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Petitioner and Respondent granted consent to file.
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Law, Religion and Civil Rights Professors
include women and men who teach constitutional
law, religious studies, theology, and employment
discrimination law. They are concerned that the
ministerial exception denies equal opportunity and
civil rights to thousands of men and women of faith
who work for religious employers. They wish to ensure that the range of scholarly and religious views
on the ministerial exception—including those that
understand the widespread problem of discrimination and the need for legal protection from discrimination—are before the Court. Their institutional
identification is for informational purposes only.
The Professors are Miguel H. Diaz, Ph.D., Ambassador to the Holy See, Ret., The John Courtney
Murray Chair in Public Service, Loyola University
Chicago; Charles E. Curran, Elizabeth Scurlock University Professor of Human Values, Southern Methodist University; Margaret A. Farley, Gilbert L. Stark
Professor Emerita of Christian Ethics, Yale Divinity
School; Prof. Marci Hamilton, Fels Institute of Government Professor of Practice, University of Pennsylvania, CEO & Academic Director, CHILD USA; Ann C.
McGinley, William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School of Law; Angela
D. Morrison, Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M
University School of Law; Michael A. Olivas, Wm. B.
Bates Distinguished Chair in Law (retired), University
of Houston Law Center; Jean Porter, John A. O’Brien
Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame;
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Jessica L. Roberts, Leonard H. Childs Chair in Law,
University of Houston Law Center.
DignityUSA believes that gay, lesbian, bisexual,
transgender, queer and intersex Catholics in our diversity are members of Christ’s mystical body, numbered
among the People of God. We have an inherent dignity
because God created us, Christ died for us, and the
Holy Spirit sanctified us in Baptism, making us temples of the Spirit, and channels through which God’s
love becomes visible. Because of this, it is our right, our
privilege, and our duty to live the sacramental life of
the Church, so that we might become more powerful
instruments of God’s love working among all people.
Catholics for Choice was founded in 1973 to
serve as a voice for Catholics who believe that the
Catholic tradition supports a woman’s moral and legal
right to follow her conscience in matters of sexuality
and reproductive health. We strive to be an expression
of Catholicism as it is lived by ordinary people. We are
part of the great majority of the faithful in the Catholic
church who disagrees with the dictates of the Vatican
on matters related to sex, marriage, family life and
motherhood. We are part of the great majority who believes that Catholic teachings on conscience mean that
every individual must follow his or her own conscience—and respect others’ right to do the same.
New Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice and reconciliation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people and the wider Catholic
Church. In our 39-year history, we have worked with
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hundreds of parishes, schools, colleges, hospitals, religious communities of vowed men and women, promoting greater equality for LGBT people. Recently, we
have been involved with numerous cases where LGBT
people and their allies have been fired from Catholic
institutions due to their support for marriage equality
and other issues. Because we value the Catholic teaching on the inherent human dignity of all people, as well
as the teaching that promotes justice for workers, we
strongly support the right of church employees to due
process when disputes occur. Catholic church employees do not forgo their U.S. civil rights when employed
by church institutions.
The Quixote Center is a social justice center
founded in 1976, animated by Catholic social teaching,
committed to the full participation of all people in
church and society. A key expression of this commitment to inclusion in terms of gender and sexuality is
the translation and publication of the Inclusive Bible
and Lectionaries, which engage the organization in
communication with church workers and the broader
community in a variety of Christian denominations.
Consistent with these values and informed by these relationships, Quixote Center supports this brief.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A non-Catholic woman and a Catholic laywoman
cannot be turned into ministers by actions of the federal courts. The Ninth Circuit ruled properly in these
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cases that these women were teachers, not ministers,
and their rulings should be affirmed. See Biel v. St.
James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
No. 19-348, 2019 WL 6880705 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F.
App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-267,
2019 WL 6880698 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019).
This Court is presently asked to answer “Whether
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses prohibit lay
teachers at religious elementary schools from bringing
employment discrimination claims.”
NO is the clear answer to that question in this
case. The civil courts can and should hear these cases
of disabilities and age discrimination. The Ninth Circuit correctly ruled that Kristen Biel and Agnes Morrissey-Berru were teachers, not ministers subject to
the ministerial exception, when they worked for two
different Catholic schools. See id. Thus Biel’s estate can
sue for disabilities discrimination, and MorrisseyBerru for age discrimination.
Amici have a long history working both as and for
employees in religious organizations. They also teach
and publish in support of employees’ rights. They urge
this Court to recognize that religious freedom is not
protected by giving religious organizations a right to
fire anyone for any reason and avoid liability under
neutral, generally applicable laws. Allowing this unchecked freedom undermines the freedom of individuals who work for such organizations and allows the
employers to engage in unfettered wrongdoing.
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This Court needs to clarify that religious freedom
does not protect all conduct. The development of sexual
abuse cases around this country proves this point. At
the beginning, many courts thought sexual abuse by
clergy was a religious decision that could not be examined by the courts because the abusers’ and their defenders’ decisions were argued as religious. Over time,
however, courts have recognized that they can decide
these cases according to neutral principles of law and
hold the wrongdoers liable for their actions. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, 135 N.E.3d 1.
Moreover, unlike Cheryl Perich, the Respondent in
this Court’s Hosanna-Tabor case, these two teachers
gave no indications they were ministers. Neither ever
used the title or took the tax status of a minister. Instead, they were named teachers and worked as teachers. Morrissey-Berru is not Catholic, so there is no way
she could be a Catholic minister. Biel was a Catholic
laywoman, and all her life her church’s theology did
not allow her to be a minister, and so the courts may
not do so now.
The post-Hosanna cases show that many employees are harmed by the defendants’ easy use of the word
minister to get rid of their cases. We present these results so that this Court clearly understands its legal
need to protect all individual employees from harm,
whether employed by a religious organization or otherwise. Such absolute religious freedom for employers
undermines the religious freedom of individual employees, which is also protected by the United States
Constitution.
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Amici repeatedly and frequently protect people
from abuse by religious and nonreligious actors. Many
religious actors hide their wrongdoing instead of revealing this abuse. This Court should remind the nation’s lower courts that religious freedom does not
protect illegal conduct, whether the sexual abuse of parishioners or age and disability discrimination against
teachers. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). These cases
should, and indeed can, be decided according to neutral, generally applicable principles of law in the civil
courts, as the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The Sexual Abuse Cases Teach Us that the
Courts Must Be Open to Protect Victims
from Harm, Even By Religious Actors.

Amici are advocates who support children’s right
to be free from sexual abuse as well as women’s and
men’s right to freedom from sexual abuse and harassment. Children’s advocates have taught us “child sexual
abuse is both everyone’s problem and responsibility.”
See Prevent Child Abuse America, Preventing Child
Sexual Abuse, https://preventchildabuse.org/resource/
preventing-child-sexual-abuse/ (emphasis added).
Through the work of children’s rights advocates,
amici have learned that “[o]ne in four girls and one in
six boys will be sexually abused before they turn 18
years old.” National Sexual Violence Resource Center,
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Get Statistics, https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737. Adults
face similar, and now more visible, problems with sexual abuse and harassment in the workplace. Slowly,
the courts have become more willing to hear their
claims of sexual harassment and abuse and the legislatures have moved to protect employees against
their employers’ wrongdoing. See, e.g., Kirkland Alert,
California Strengthens Sexual Harassment Laws in
Wake of #MeToo, Jan. 14, 2019, https://www.kirkland.
com/publications/kirkland-alert/2019/01/californiastrengthens-sexual-harassment-laws; Kristen Rasmussen, Sexual Harassment Cases Surged Last Year in
Wake of #MeToo: Seyfarth Report, LAW.COM, Jan. 7,
2019, https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/01/07/
sexual-harassment-cases-surged-last-year-in-wake-ofmetoo-seyfarth-report/?slreturn=20200025102719.
Some law professors who support the ministerial exception have explained that it should not bar sexual
harassment claims based on a pervasive, hostile environment. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Robert W. Tuttle, #metoo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment
Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.
249, 249 (2019).
The lawyers’ path in abuse cases against religious
perpetrators and entities has been difficult because, in
the past, courts frequently protected such abuse, incorrectly believing that abuse-related decisions were protected by privacy or religious liberty. The courts rarely
wanted to interfere with the free practice of religion.
See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
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The disgusting and pervasive facts about sexual
abuse across the country, however, have changed the
law’s perspective on the range of religious freedom.
The lower courts have clarified that sexual abuse, and
the protection of abusers from courts and police, are
always against “neutral principles of law,” and can be
handled justly by state and federal courts without interfering with religious freedom. Allowing survivors of
abuse into court is one of the best ways that everyone
can receive justice. For example, the Illinois Supreme
Court allowed one Jane Doe, who was sexually assaulted by a youth pastor at her church, to sue the pastor and the church for negligent hiring, supervision,
and retention. Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, 135 N.E.3d
1, 19-20. Negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention are all direct causes of action
against the employer for the employer’s misconduct in
failing to reasonably hire, supervise, or retain the employee. In the past, courts thought they were religious
decisions. Now the courts recognize those cases can be
decided according to neutral principles of law. Id.
State and federal prosecutors, judges, and legislators have increasingly recognized the need to protect
children from religious wrongdoers, whether they are
ministers who abuse children2 or their superiors who
2

Broadly speaking, amici hope the outcome of this case emphasizes the fact that religious organizations can and should be
subject to neutral and generally applicable laws, because sexual
abuse, assault, and harassment (among other claims) are not related to religious doctrine, with most religions preaching against
this conduct. These claims, and those at issue in this case, can be
decided without entanglement with religious doctrine.
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work to systematically conceal misconduct from police.
See, e.g., In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand
Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018). Across the country, thousands of children are in danger of abuse by these types
of offenders whose misconduct may take decades to reveal, a lapse in time that is only amplified by systemic
employer cover-ups. Id.
While this case does not involve children, this
Court should clarify that religious freedom does not
provide religious organizations freedom from neutral,
generally applicable laws, or allow them to fire nonminister teachers for disabilities or age. As in the sex
abuse cases, such decisions have no relation to ministry, the only title expressly protected. Consequently, it
is of vital importance that this Court clarify the law,
thereby encouraging others to come forward and discontinue their silence for fear of dismissal of their
cases by hesitant courts. As organizations and individuals devoted to the protection of children’s and adults’
well-being, we urge this Court to affirm the correct decisions of the Ninth Circuit that Biel and MorrisseyBerru were teachers, not ministers, as well as reinforce
and clarify the applicability of neutral and generally
applicable laws to religious organizations.
II.

These Cases Can Be Decided According to
Neutral Principles of Law.

This Court has long stated that religious actors
are required to obey neutral laws because the rule of
law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
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595, 604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res.
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court
should clarify that the neutral principles of law apply
to this case. Consistent with this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, state and federal courts have abstained from hearing cases only when the dispute
cannot be resolved according to neutral principles of
law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary,
426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) (“Secular courts may,
however, have jurisdiction over a case involving a
church if ‘neutral principles of law’ can be applied in
reaching the resolution.”).
For this reason, courts allow lawsuits against a
Christian seminary to proceed because the litigation
can be resolved according to neutral, non-religious
principles of law, just like the teachers’ case here. Id.
at 615. See also Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1001
(N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when tort and contract claims
can be “ ‘resolved by the application of purely neutral
principles of law and without impermissible government intrusion . . . there is no First Amendment shield
to litigation’ ”) (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d
840, 856 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citations omitted)).
Petitioners mischaracterize Biel’s and MorrisseyBerru’s cases as religious disputes that the courts cannot adjudicate. This misinterprets the women’s lawsuits for disabilities and age discrimination, which can
be determined according to neutral principles of law,
just as the sex abuse cases have been.
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Biel filed a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) because her employer fired her after
she began chemotherapy for breast cancer. According
to the ADA:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability
in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability means “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual, a record
of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
Biel easily, neutrally, and non-religiously can argue that she was discriminated against due to her
breast cancer. Cancer qualifies as a disability under
the statute:
Despite significant gains in cancer survival
rates, people with cancer still experience barriers to equal job opportunities. Often, employees with cancer face discrimination
because of their supervisors’ and co-workers’
misperceptions about their ability to work
during and after cancer treatment. Even
when the prognosis is excellent, some employers expect that a person diagnosed with cancer will take long absences from work or be
unable to focus on job duties.
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As a result of changes made by the ADAAA
[ADA Amendments Act of 2008], people who
currently have cancer, or have cancer that is
in remission, should easily be found to have a
disability within the meaning of the first part
of the ADA’s definition of disability because
they are substantially limited in the major life
activity of normal cell growth or would be so
limited if cancer currently in remission was to
recur.
U.S. E.E.O.C, Questions and Answers About Cancer in
the Workplace, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/cancer.cfm
(emphasis added) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“it
should easily be concluded that the following types of
impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit
the major life activities indicated . . . cancer substantially limits normal cell growth”)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)
(1)(vii) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission
is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life
activity when active.”).
Biel’s employer was covered by the lawsuit, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a), and the school’s religious status has
nothing to do with its liabilities toward employees who
have no ministerial status. Biel’s firing demonstrates
that she suffered “negative job action based on disability.” Id.
Morrissey-Berru’s lawsuit can also be resolved according to neutral principles of law. Morrissey-Berru
filed an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, case against her employer.
That law does not allow employers “to exclude or to
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expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his age.” 29
U.S.C. § 623. Because Morrissey-Berru is a teacher, the
lawsuit is about her age, and whether she was discriminated against because of it. The courts can review
age-related claims without paying any attention to
Morrissey-Berru’s religion or her school’s religion. Her
lawsuit can be decided according to neutral principles
of law.
Like the sex abuse cases, both of these lawsuits
can be litigated according to neutral principles of law.
Neither Morrissey-Berru nor Biel, moreover, can be
considered a minister.
III. The Facts Show, as the Ninth Circuit
Ruled, that Biel and Morrissey-Berru were
both Teachers.
Biel was a teacher. Following this Court’s reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Ninth Circuit distinguished Biel from Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor.
Biel, by contrast, has none of Perich’s credentials, training, or ministerial background.
There was no religious component to her liberal studies degree or teaching credential. St.
James had no religious requirements for her
position. And, even after she began working
there, her training consisted of only a half-day
conference whose religious substance was
limited. Unlike Perich, who joined the
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Lutheran teaching ministry as a calling, Biel
appears to have taken on teaching work wherever she could find it: tutoring companies,
multiple public schools, another Catholic
school, and even a Lutheran school.
Biel, 911 F.3d at 608. The court concluded there was
nothing in Biel’s title, “Grade 5 Teacher,” or work that
could lead to the conclusion she was a minister. Id.
“And she neither presented herself as nor was presented by St. James as a minister.” Id. at 610. On the
fourth part of this Court’s test, the court recognized
that teaching lessons in the Catholic faith could not
make her a minister:
A contrary rule, under which any school employee who teaches religion would fall within
the ministerial exception, would not be faithful to Hosanna-Tabor or its underlying constitutional and policy considerations. Such a rule
would render most of the analysis in Hosanna-Tabor irrelevant. It would base the exception on a single aspect of the employee’s
role rather than on a holistic examination of
her training, duties, title, and the extent to
which she is tasked with transmitting religious ideas.
Such a rule is also not needed to advance the
Religion Clauses’ purpose of leaving religious
groups free to “put their faith in the hands of
their ministers.” . . . to comport with the
Founders’ intent, the exception need not
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extend to every employee whose job has a religious component.
Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added).
Following Hosanna-Tabor, the Ninth Circuit also
ruled that Morrissey-Berru was a teacher, not a minister. Her “formal title of ‘Teacher’ was secular.” Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461.
Aside from taking a single course on the history of the Catholic church, Morrissey-Berru
did not have any religious credential, training,
or ministerial background. Morrissey-Berru
also did not hold herself out to the public as a
religious leader or minister.
Id. Moreover, Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic. This
alone proves she cannot be a Catholic minister by any
stretch of the imagination.
The Ninth Circuit made a careful review of the
facts in both these cases, determining that, as their titles demonstrated, these two teachers could proceed in
their legal cases against their employers. Other courts
have also concluded that teachers at religious schools
are not automatically ministers.3 Courts have
3

See, e.g., Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple, 32 Cal. App. 5th
1159, 1161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 547 (Ct. App.), reh’g denied
(Apr. 2, 2019), review denied (June 19, 2019), cert. dismissed, 140
S. Ct. 341 (2019) (preschool teachers are not ministers); Starkey
v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., No.
119CV03153RLYTAB, 2019 WL 7019362 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2019)
(allowing discovery to proceed for Catholic high school guidance
counselor); Hough v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, No. CIV.A.
12-253, 2014 WL 834473, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014) (mere
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comments by employer about teachers’ ministerial status did not
make them ministers pre-discovery); Bonadona v. Louisiana
Coll., No. 1:18-CV-00224, 2019 WL 4073247, at *5 (W.D. La. Aug.
28, 2019) (finding that a football coach is not a minister); Dias v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (a Non-Catholic Technology Coordinator at a Catholic school is not a minister); Herx v. Diocese of
Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind. 2014)
(Catholic schoolteacher is not a minister, so her Title VII sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination lawsuits could proceed); Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F.Supp.3d 1132,
1138 (D. Or. 2017) (Professor of Exercise Science was not a minister); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco,
136 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Catholic high school’s
biology teacher was not a minister, even though she did some
work for the campus ministry); Gallagher v. Archdiocese of Phila.,
2017 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 148, *24-25 (sixth grade teacher
Cindy Gallagher was not a minister, she was a “lay teacher” at a
Catholic school); Braun v. St. Pius X Par., 827 F.Supp.2d 1312
(N.D. Okla. 2011), aff ’d, 509 F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting ministerial exemption for lay teacher of secular subjects who
was not member of parochial school faith); Redhead v. Conference
of Seventh–Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) adhered to on reconsideration, 566 F.Supp.2d 125 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (“plaintiff ’s teaching duties were primarily secular; those
religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day and attending religious ceremonies with students
only once per year”); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Indianapolis, 42 F.Supp.2d 849, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“[plaintiff ]
did participate in some religious activities as a teacher at All
Saints, but it cannot be fairly said that she functioned as a minister or a member of the clergy”); Galetti v. Reeve, 2014-NMCA079, ¶ 5, 331 P.3d 997, 999-1000 (Melissa Galetti, principal of a
Seventh Day Adventist School, was not a minister); Mis v. Fairfield Coll. Preparatory Sch., No. FBTCV166057613, 2018 WL
7568910, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) (history teacher
at Catholic high school is not a minister even though employers
said he was really an Ignatian Educator).
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similarly ruled that other employees of religious institutions are not ministers.4 Some courts have understood this point and demonstrated that the
employment laws can be applied to employees of religious organizations, including teachers, without adverse effect on religious freedom.5
Like all these other employees, Biel and MorriseyBerru are not ministers, but are teachers. Therefore
the ministerial exception does not apply.

4

See, e.g., Kelley v. Decatur Baptist Church, No. 5:17-CV1239-HNJ, 2018 WL 2130433 (N.D. Ala. May 9, 2018) (Kelley, a
maintenance and child care employee at Baptist institution, could
not be ruled a minister); Rose v. Baptist Children’s Homes of N.
Carolina, No. 1:19-CV-620, 2019 WL 5575878, at *3 (M.D.N.C.
Oct. 29, 2019) (married couple that was not hired because wife
was deaf should not have their case dismissed at an early stage);
Edley-Worford v. Virginia Conference of United Methodist
Church, No. 3:19CV647 (DJN), 2019 WL 7340301, at *6-8 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 30, 2019) (currently facts are insufficient to support ministerial exception); Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985
F.Supp.2d 701 (D.Md. 2013) (denying application of ministerial
exception to employee whose primary duties—maintenance, custodial, and janitorial work—were entirely secular); Bigelow v.
Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, 247 N.C. App. 401, 402, 786
S.E.2d 358, 360 (2016) (pastor can sue for breach of contract); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., 2015 WL 9682042, at *10-11 (Mass. Super. Dec. 16, 2015) (Food Service Director at Catholic school was
not a minister).
5
See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d
Cir. 1993) (high school teacher allowed to sue for age discrimination); Longo v. Regis Jesuit High Sch., 02-CV-001957-PSF-OES,
2006 WL 197336 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2006) (ADA claim allowed for
high school teacher); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206
(1992) (computer professors allowed to sue a Catholic university
for breach of contract).
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IV. Neither the Non-Catholic Morrissey-Berru
nor the Laywoman Catholic Biel Can Become a Catholic Minister in Court.
One difficulty with the ministerial rule is that
women employees of denominations that do not ordain
women suddenly become ministers at the moment they
file a lawsuit. Although Roman Catholic, Muslim and
Orthodox Jewish women may not become priests,
imams, or rabbis and perform their jobs with full understanding that they cannot be ministers, the courts
and churches confer ministerial status upon them just
long enough to keep their lawsuits out of court.6

6

Cases involving Catholic women incorrectly deemed ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception include Fratello v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190, 203-04
(2d Cir. 2017) (Catholic woman lay principal was ruled to be a
minister); Ciurleo v. St. Regis Par., 214 F.Supp.3d 647 (E.D. Mich.
2016) (Catholic grade school teacher is a minister); Ginalski v.
Diocese of Gary, No. 2:15-CV-95-PRC, 2016 WL 7100558 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 5, 2016) (Catholic school principal is minister); Petruska
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (non-ordained chaplain assured women were eligible for her position); AliceaHernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir.
2003) (Catholic communications director); Skrzypczak v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2010)
(Catholic Director of Religious Formation); Musante v. Notre
Dame of Easton Church, CIV.A. 301CV2352MRK, 2004 WL
721774 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004) (Director of Religious Education); Pardue v. the Center City of Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (school
principal); Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. Minagorri, 954 So. 2d 640
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (school principal); Brazauskas v. Fort
Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003) (Director
of Religious Education); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing,
756 N.W. 2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (elementary school
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision was correct because,
as a non-Catholic, Morrissey-Berru cannot be a Catholic minister. Similarly, by Catholic theology Biel was a
laywoman, not a priest. Indeed, as Catholic women
learn in churches and schools across the world, she
cannot be a priest. Accordingly the teachers’ work
must be analyzed by the principles that apply to all
teachers.
Agnes Morrissey-Berru is not Catholic. Our Lady
of Guadalupe School, a Catholic school that does not
require its employees to be Catholic, hired her as one
of its teachers. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against her employer.
That lawsuit should proceed. Even if some of Morrissey-Berru’s responsibilities at the school were religious, the courts and the schools cannot turn a nonCatholic into a Catholic minister. Ordaining her a
minister in order to award her employer a court victory
would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
In Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012), for
example, a non-Catholic Technology Coordinator was
fired by a Catholic school. The Ohio district court refused to recognize her as a minister. In Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014),
teacher); Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish, 672 A.2d 217 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (high school principal); Coulee Catholic
Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, Dept. of Workforce Dev.,
768 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009) (first grade teacher).
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the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that a
Jewish rabbi could not be called a minister at a Christian seminary, even though the seminary urged the
ministerial title in order for the lawsuit to be dismissed. Kant participated in many religious ceremonies and events, including the school’s chapel
ceremonies. Using this Court’s Hosanna factors, the
Court concluded Kant was not a minister. Id. at 591592. Therefore Kant was a professor whose breach of
contract lawsuit could be heard by the court without
violating the First Amendment. In Braun v. St. Pius X
Par., 827 F.Supp.2d 1312 (N.D. Okla. 2011), aff ’d, 509
F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2013), the court ruled a nonCatholic fifth grade teacher at a Catholic school could
not be a minister of the Catholic faith. As the Court
concluded, “It is difficult to conceive that Braun might
properly be classified as a minister of the Catholic faith
when she is not even a member of that faith.” Id. at
1319.
In a terrible case of kidnapping and torture, John
Doe, a Muslim man born in Syria, argued that the
Presbyterian Church wrongly put a video of his baptism on the Internet, even though he had asked the
church to keep news of his baptism private. Doe v. First
Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, 421 P.3d 284, 291
(Okla. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 940 (2019). As a
response to the video, Doe was kidnapped and tortured
by Syrian extremists. The appeals court dismissed any
ministerial exception defense, noting “Doe simply
asked for baptism, but never to become a member subject to the Appellees’ ecclesiastical hierarchy. Without
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this consent, Doe’s religious freedom to not subject
himself to the Appellees’ judicature must be respected
and honored under the longstanding and clear constitutional decisions from our Court and the Supreme
Court of the United States.” Id. at 291.
Religious freedom principles keep non-Catholic
Morrissey-Berru from being converted into a Catholic
minister by the courts.
The courts would also violate the First Amendment if they identified laywoman Kristen Biel as a
minister. Biel is in similar circumstances to Cindy Gallagher, a sixth grade “lay teacher” at a Philadelphia
Catholic school. Gallagher v. Archdiocese of Phila.,
2017 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 148, *24-25.
[Gallagher’s] teaching qualifications or duties
in no way compare to the called teacher in Hosanna-Tabor. Appellee was not formally labeled a minister of the Catholic Church or
even held herself out as a minister; Appellee
did not plan or lead mass; Appellee was only
considered to be a “lay teacher.” Thus, labeling
Appellee as a minister of the church based on
her role in prayer with her students and her
participation in obtaining mandatory religious credits to be a teacher at the school
would expand the scope of the ministerial exception beyond its intended purpose. Clearly,
Appellee was not a minister for purposes of
the ministerial exception. The record does not
support a conclusion that Appellee was a ministerial employee. Accordingly, Appellee’s
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defamation claim was not barred by the First
Amendment.
Id.
The Philadelphia court ruled there, as the Ninth
Circuit did here, that the teachers’ responsibilities did
not turn them into ministers. As Catholic laywomen,
Biel and other Catholic women know very well that
their church does not recognize women in its priesthood:
The Catechism of the Catholic Church states
that only men can receive holy orders because
Jesus chose men as his apostles, and the
“apostles did the same when they chose collaborators to succeed them in their ministry.”
Blessed John Paul II wrote in 1994 that this
teaching is definitive and not open to debate
among Catholics.
Francis X. Rocca, Why Not Women Priests? The Papal
Theologian Explains, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER,
Feb. 5, 2013, https://www.ncronline.org/news/theology/
why-not-women-priests-papal-theologian-explains
(emphasis added). The article continued, the “son of
God became flesh, but became flesh not as sexless humanity but as a male, . . . since a priest is supposed to
serve as an image of Christ, his maleness is essential
to that role.” Id. (emphasis added). This is not a teaching the courts can overturn without impermissible entanglement. By making Biel and Morrissey-Berru
ministers, the Court would be in violation of the Constitution.
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A Vatican representative recently reasserted the
“infallible” nature of the popes’ teaching on a male-only
priesthood:
The leader of the Vatican’s doctrine department says the Church’s belief in a male-only
priesthood is infallible teaching which should
be held as an unchanging and “definitive” part
of the Catholic faith.
Delivering the most forthright doctrinal statement so far against the ordination of women
under Francis’ papacy, Cardinal-designate
Luis Ladaria SJ says that maleness is “an indispensable element” of the priesthood and
that the Church is “bound” by Christ’s decision to only choose male apostles.
Christopher Lamb, Vatican’s Doctrine Prefect Says
Church Teaching on Male-Only Priesthood is “Definitive,” THE TABLET, May 30, 2018, https://www.the
tablet.co.uk/news/9167/vatican-s-doctrine-prefect-sayschurch-teaching-on-male-only-priesthood-is-definitive(emphasis added). This theologian’s recent remarks
confirmed the teaching of Pope John Paul II, who insisted that “[p]riestly ordination . . . [has] from the
beginning always been reserved to men alone.” John
Paul II, Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, 1994,
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_
letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19940522_ordinatiosacerdotalis.html (emphasis added). As Pope John
Paul II added, “Therefore, in granting admission to the
ministerial priesthood, the Church has always
acknowledged as a perennial norm her Lord’s way of

25
acting in choosing the twelve men whom he made the
foundation of his Church,” Id. As the pope concluded:
Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great importance, a matter which pertains to the
Church’s divine constitution itself, in virtue of
my ministry of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk
22:32) I declare that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this judgment is to be
definitively held by all the Church’s faithful.
Id. Catholic priests have been disciplined or suspended
for engaging in ministries with women. Id.
In contrast, the Catholic laity are recognized for
their “secular” character. CWR Staff, Cardinal Arinze
on the Role of the Laity, CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT, Oct.
9, 2013. Kristen Biel always understood that she was
a laywoman, not a priest or a minister. The courts need
to recognize, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the status
that she held did not ordain her to the priesthood. As
well, Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic and the Court
cannot redefine her faith into a faith that is not her
own.
V.

Employees’ Religious Freedom is at Stake
in These Cases.

In Hosanna-Tabor, this Court recognized that the
two Religion Clauses mandate the Court’s recognition
of a ministerial exception. That exception, however, is
not absolute. As this Court held, each ministerial
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exception case should be influenced by the specific
facts before the court. The ministerial exception should
not authorize courts to ordain plaintiffs when their
own churches have not, nor should it exempt churches
from all liability.
“The First Amendment stands as a bulwark
against official religious prejudice and embodies our
Nation’s deep commitment to religious plurality and
tolerance. That constitutional promise is why, ‘[f ]or
centuries now, people have come to this country from
every corner of the world to share in the blessing of
religious freedom.’ ” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2446-47, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S., at
___, 134 S.Ct., at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). See also
Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, 421
P.3d 284, 291 (Okla. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 940
(2019).
As part of our blessing of religious freedom, the
Free Exercise Clause reserves the right of American
citizens to accept any religious belief, but limits their
rights to action. Smith, 449 U.S. at 877. It does not allow religious employers to change their actions when
they get to court if it keeps the case non-justiciable. In
other words, although the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act, whether religiously motivated
or otherwise, is not.
Under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the
government’s action in turning a non-Catholic woman
and a Catholic laywoman into ministers would
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substantially burden the two women’s religious beliefs.
The government has no compelling interest to keep the
present lawsuits out of court. Instead, the government
has a strong interest in making sure that disabilities
discrimination and age discrimination are prohibited
for employers, and not excused away by falsely calling
someone a minister. Under Sherbert and Smith, employers must obey the law when ministers are not involved, as is true in this case. Id.; 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
The consequences of a pro-Petitioners ruling
would be overwhelming if lay Catholic teachers were
turned into ministers by the courts. “Sixty-six percent
of private schools, enrolling 78 percent of private
school students and employing 70 percent of private
school FTE [full-time-equivalent] teachers in 2017-18,
had a religious orientation or purpose.”7 In 2018-2019,
there were 6,289 Catholic elementary, middle and secondary schools.8 In those schools, “non-Catholic student enrollment has risen from 2.7% in 1970 to 11.2%
a decade later and today is 18.7%.”9 In Catholic schools,
3,344 schools with 113,152 students received Title I
7

STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, BRIAN KINCEL, JENNIFER PETERCHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED
STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2017-18 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE
SURVEY: FIRST LOOK (2019) 2, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/
2019071.pdf.
8
DALE MCDONALD AND MARGARET SCHULTZ, UNITED STATES
CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: THE ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT AND STAFFING
2018-2019, 155, https://www.ncea.org/ncea/proclaim/catholic_school_
data/catholic_school_data.aspx.
9
Id. at 349; see also id. at Exhibit 28.

SON,
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aid; 2,756 schools with 133,104 students for breakfast
and 210,084 for lunch received nutrition aid; 1,817
schools with 197,623 students received transportation
aid.10 Over the past decade, the lay faculty percentages
increased from 93% to the current 97.2%. At present,
only 2.8% of the professional staff are religious and
clergy.11
The lay faculty, who generously give their lives to
Catholic and non-Catholic students throughout the
country, know very well that they are not ministers,
just as their employers know they are not ministers
until the very moment a lawsuit is filed. If the courts
turn them into ministers, there is danger that they
cannot practice their own religions or turn to the
courts when their employers mistreat them. This
Court should make clear that religious employers are
not given freedom to discriminate against them in any
way.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
“The clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). The
courts cannot prefer religion by giving religious employers a right to fire their teachers for disabilities or
age discrimination. Or for sexual harassment and
10
11

Id. at 378; see also id. at Exhibits 35-37.
Id. at 151, 357; see also id. at Exhibit 31.
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sexual abuse and other terrible things that happen to
church employees and parishioners.
The courts are capable of adjudicating these employment cases against religious organizations without need of the ministerial exception. These cases, like
so many others, can be decided according to “neutral
principles of law.”
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to
affirm the decisions below.
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